Thursday, October 17, 2019

Quick Snapshot of Land Acquisition Cases under S.24(2) of the 2013 Act


Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 59 at page 187
10. Insofar as sub-section (1) of Section 24 is concerned, it begins with non obstante clause. By this, Parliament has given overriding effect to this provision over all other provisions of the 2013 Act. It is provided in clause (a) that where the land acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award under Section 11 is made, then the provisions of the 2013 Act shall apply relating to the determination of compensation. Clause (b) of Section 24(1) makes provision that where land acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the 1894 Act and award has been made under Section 11, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if that Act has not been repealed.
 11. Section 24(2) also begins with non obstante clause. This provision has overriding effect over Section 24(1). Section 24(2) enacts that in relation to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, where an award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the two contingencies is satisfied viz. (i) physical possession of the land has not been taken, or (ii) the compensation has not been paid; such acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. On the lapse of such acquisition proceedings, if the appropriate Government still chooses to acquire the land which was the subject-matter of acquisition under the 1894 Act then it has to initiate the proceedings afresh under the 2013 Act. The proviso appended to Section 24(2) deals with a situation where in respect of the acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries then all the beneficiaries specified in the Section 4 notification become entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act.
17. ……………….. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been “paid” within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33

21. The argument on behalf of the Corporation that the subject land acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under the 1894 Act and that they are not affected at all in view of Section 114(2) of the 2013 Act, has no merit at all, and is noted to be rejected. Section 114(1) of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 114, however, makes Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applicable with regard to the effect of repeal but this is subject to the provisions in the 2013 Act. Under Section 24(2) land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed where award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and possession of the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid. The legal fiction under Section 24(2) comes into operation as soon as conditions stated therein are satisfied. The applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act being subject to Section 24(2), there is no merit in the contention of the Corporation.

07.12.2017: TWO JUDGE INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (2018) 1 SCC 733
23. There is already a reference made as to the applicability of Section 24 in Yogesh Neema v. State of M.P. [Yogesh Neema v. State of M.P., (2016) 6 SCC 387 : (2016) 3 SCC (Civ) 183] vide order dated 12-1-2016. There are several other issues arising which have been mentioned above but have not been considered in Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] Thus, here is a case where the matter should be considered by a larger Bench. Let the matter be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

08.02.2018:  Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 100 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426 at page 549
214. In Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] the land acquisition had been quashed by the High Court in the year 2008. Most of the special leave petitions were filed in this Court in the year 2008. The High Court has quashed the acquisition proceedings and has directed restoration of the possession. When the High Court has quashed the acquisition, there was no room for this Court to entertain the submissions based upon Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. There was no question of payment of compensation to the owners or depositing it in the court as land acquisition itself had been quashed in 2008. There was no subsisting acquisition and award. When the 2013 Act came into force thus no question could have been raised as to non-compliance with Section 24 for five years or more. Thus, there was no question of taking possession or payment of compensation as per provisions contained in Section 24(2). The provisions contained in Section 24 could not be said to be applicable after quashing/lapse of the proceedings. Thus, when the provisions of Section 24 were not attracted to the fact situation of the case in Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] , the decision cannot be said to be an authority on a question which, in fact, did not arise for consideration of this Court. Thus, the decision rendered on a question which was not germane to the case cannot be said to be a binding precedent, it is obiter dicta and thus has to be ignored.
216. With respect to the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] we have given deep thinking whether to refer it to further larger Bench but it was not considered necessary as we are of the opinion that Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] has to be held per incuriam, inter alia, for the following reasons:

21.02.2018: State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corpn. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 585 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 145 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 572 at page 587
9. Taking all this into consideration, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate if in the interim and pending a final decision on making a reference (if at all) to a larger Bench, the High Courts be requested not to deal with any cases relating to the interpretation of or concerning Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The Secretary General will urgently communicate this order to the Registrar General of every High Court so that our request is complied with.
10. Insofar as the cases pending in this Court are concerned, we request the Benches concerned dealing with similar matters to defer the hearing until a decision is rendered one way or the other on the issue whether the matter should be referred to a larger Bench or not. Apart from anything else, deferring the consideration would avoid inconvenience to the litigating parties, whether it is the State or individuals.

22-2-2018 Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma [Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma, SLPs (C) Nos. 9798-99 of 2016, order dated 22-2-2018 (SC)] passed the following order:
“Vide order dated 18-4-2016 Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma [Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma, SLPs (C) Nos. 9798-99 of 2016 with SLPs (Civil) Nos. 9036-38 of 2016, order dated 18-4-2016 (SC), wherein it was directed:“List these matters after the decision in SLP (Civil) No. 10742 of 2008. Status quo shall be maintained in the meantime. It would be open to the respondents to file counter-affidavit.”] , this matter was directed to be listed after the decision in SLP (Civil) No. 10742 of 2008. The same has since been decided in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412] . A copy of order dated 21-2-2018 in State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corpn. Ltd. [State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corpn. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 585] has been shown to this Court by Mr Rohatgi, Senior Advocate. We are of the view that having regard to the nature of the issues involved in the matter, the issues need to be resolved by a larger Bench at the earliest. These matters may be placed before the appropriate Bench tomorrow i.e. 23-2-2018, as per orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India.

22.02.2018: another two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust [State of Haryana v. Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust, Civil Appeal No. 4835 of 2015, order dated 22-2-2018 (SC)] passed the following order:
“In view of the order of this Court dated 21-2-2018 in State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corpn. Ltd. [State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corpn. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 585] , that has been placed before this Court, we consider it appropriate that these matters be referred to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute an appropriate Bench and to see whether we can proceed with the hearing or not. Since a larger issue is involved, we refer the matters to the Hon'ble Chief Justice to be dealt with by an appropriate Bench, as his Lordship may consider appropriate.”

5 JUGES - 06.03.2018 : Indore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma, (2018) 3 SCC 405 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 261 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 420 at page 411
8. Keeping in view the aforesaid orders, it was thought appropriate by the Chief Justice of India to constitute a Constitution Bench to deal with all the issues in an apposite manner, and that is how these matters have been placed before us.
10. We would have proceeded for hearing of these matters but as we are in the midst of hearing of another Constitution Bench matter, we think it appropriate to list these matters after conclusion of hearing of Item No. 506 i.e. WP (Crl.) No. 76 of 2016. However, the matters shall remain in the cause-list.




Wednesday, September 11, 2019

Reasons to believe




Many statutes require recording of reasons to believe or actions are based on sufficiency of reasons to believe. In this context, the following aspects would be relevant:

Supreme Court has held in Income Tax Officer v. Lakhmani Mewaldas 1976 (3) SCR 956 and Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. ITO [1993] 203 ITR 456 (SC)that there should be a link between the evidence resulting to any reason to believe.   It has been held in Aslam Mohd Merchant v. Competent Authority(2008) 14 SCC 186, that there must be some material for reason to believe before initiating the proceedings. 

Section 26 of the Indian Penal Code defines “reasons to believe”, as a person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise.  Thus,  the phrase “reason” to believe, must hinge on “sufficiency” of cause.